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DIFFERENCE AND DEFERENCE IN THE TENOR OF LEARNING
ABSTRACT. The critical resources furnished by deconstruction have more than occa-
sionally been turned with negative effect on traditional and more recent conceptions of
liberal learning, including the reaffirmation of the humanities associated with philosoph-
ical hermeneutics. The first two sections of the paper review the contrasting and mutually
opposed stances towards learning represented by early formulations of deconstruction and
of hermeneutics. An exploration is then undertaken in the later sections of developments
that have taken place in both deconstruction and hermeneutics since the Derrida-Gadamer
encounter in Paris in 1981. While not in any sense assimilating hermeneutics to decon-
struction or vice versa, this exploration identifies significant shifts in later formulations
of both which provide a more inclusive context for understanding learning as a human
undertaking, including the identification of tensions that are more promising than negative.
KEY WORDS: deconstruction, deference, Derrida, difference, Gadamer, hermeneutics
INTRODUCTION
The words “difference” and “deference” in the title summarise two
currently influential but contrasting standpoints towards how inheritances
of human learning are to be understood and studied. More precisely,
the contrast is between two recognisably different clusters, or constella-
tions, than between two clearly distinct schools of thought. On the one
hand, under the term “deference” stands a range of fresh articulations
of traditional ideals of liberal education, ranging from the more conser-
vative presentation of philosophers like Michael Oakeshott and Alasdair
MacIntyre to more critical ones like those of Hans-Georg Gadamer and
Paul Ricoeur. On the other hand, under the term “difference” stands an
array of “postmodern” standpoints – ones that are variously sceptical
of or antagonistic towards traditional forms of learning. These include,
most notably, the more influential arguments of philosophers like Michel
Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Jean François Lyotard.
In identifying two prominent clusters from the unprecedented plurality
of thought in contemporary Western civilisation my intention is to focus
on some issues of enduring disagreement which may yet repay the explor-
atory attempts of a presentation such as this. This is not to relegate the
importance of other prominent currents of thought, whether pragmatist,
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feminist or other in character, whether Western or other in ancestry. Indeed
the kind of scope provided by a short presentation leads me to narrow
the focus even further, to a consideration of some key issues where the
contrast in standpoints is most marked, and of greatest practical import.
Thus, by adopting a narrower canvas, one may also hope to contribute to a
distinct, if modest advance in a thinking about education which is incisive
and defensible.
Again, the words “difference” and “deference” in the title provide the
point of departure for this more sharply focused exploration. In short,
this will be an exploration of how differently the central undertakings of
education are to be understood and practised under two approaches which
have themselves been continually developing in the last few decades: the
“philosophical hermeneutics” of Gadamer on the one hand and the “decon-




Unlike the kind of commitment evident in the self-declared conservatism
of Oakeshott (Oakeshott, 1962), or in MacIntyre’s anti-modernist criti-
cisms of “the Enlightenment project” (MacIntyre, 1985, 1987, 1988, 1990,
1998), Gadamer views his own work as eschewing “commitments” of
this kind. In the course of many references to his formative influences he
describes himself as taking up an other-than-metaphysical impetus. This
impetus was provided not only by Heidegger but also by Kierkegaard’s
critique of Hegel (Gadamer, 1985, p. 63; 1997, p. 46). More surpris-
ingly, he also includes among the abiding influences on his thought a
non-Platonist emphasis which his own researches repeatedly discern in
Plato (Gadamer, 1985, p. 193; 1997, pp. 33–34). Gadamer stresses that his
efforts to provide a philosophical account of human understanding have
nothing to do with unphilosophical “commitments,” nor with providing a
“technique” of understanding. As he explains in his Foreword to the second
German edition of Truth and Method:
If there is any practical consequence of the present investigation, it certainly has nothing to
do with an unscientific (unwissenschaftliche) “commitment;” instead, it is concerned with
the “scientific” (wissenschaftliche) integrity of acknowledging the commitment involved
in all understanding. My real concern was and is philosophic: not what we do or what we
ought to do, but what happens to us over and above our wanting and doing (Gadamer, 1975,
p. xiv).
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In the course of pursuing this concern Gadamer has drawn a range of
distinctive conclusions, many of which have decisive implications for how
teaching and learning are to be understood and practised. In summary,
these include: (1) that, over and above our wanting and doing, what
happens to us as humans whenever understanding of any kind takes
place involves preconceptions more than conceptions, prejudgements more
than judgements; (2) that these prior influences have invariably predis-
posed in one direction or another all our efforts to understand; (3) that
we are frequently unaware of the presence of such prior influences, or,
even when we are, of their extent; (4) that such prior influences cannot
be finally overcome and set aside by any method or technique, or by
some objective philosophical overview; (5) that as human beings in a
world shared with others, we unavoidably find ourselves in the midst of
linguistically constituted cultural inheritances that have already signifi-
cantly shaped our lives; (6) that a proper awareness of the predisposing
effects of linguistically constituted inheritances highlights the priority of
being-consciously-among-others, over any priority epistemology might
claim (with Descartes) for subjective consciousness; (7) that a histori-
cally alert disciplining of this being-among-others might provide the best
starting point for critical philosophical enquiry and the best safeguards
against making excessive philosophical claims; (8) that the hermeneutic
account of human possibilities and limitations might apply not just to this
or that instance of understanding, but universally to human understanding
as such.
In this representative selection of points from Gadamer’s writings we
can recognise themes that are also prominent in one form or another in
other contemporary philosophical writings, including those Wittgenstein,
Popper and some American pragmatists. But where the forces of continuity
and those of critique are concerned, Gadamer somehow seems to grant to
those of continuity – including their inbuilt biases – a weight of influence
which dwarfs the best efforts of critique. This suspicion has led to criti-
cisms of philosophical hermeneutics for passing over, all too silently, the
distortions embedded in inherited traditions. It has also led to criticisms
that hermeneutics is a form of “closet essentialism.” The former charge
followed the publication of the first edition of Truth and Method in 1960
and was led by Jürgen Habermas, arguing from the standpoint of critique
of ideology (Ideologiekritik). This charge is not my main concern here.
Still it is worth remarking in passing that the lively, and largely fruitful
exchange which followed between Gadamer and Habermas has led to a
more evident concern with critical and practical issues in Gadamer’s later
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works and to a greater hermeneutical alertness in Habermas’ later writings
on communicative action and discourse ethics.
The more recent charge of “closet essentialism,” or that philosoph-
ical hermeneutics is a covert metaphysics, is a “Derridean critique” of
Gadamer’s work. It has been led not by Derrida himself, but by one of
Derrida’s chief interpreters and most faithful advocates in the English
language, John D. Caputo. At the start of his essay “Gadamer’s Closet
Essentialism: A Derridean Critique,” Caputo quotes a passage from Truth
and Method which has also been selected for particular attention by other
critics of Gadamer. That passage (as quoted in an edited way by Caputo)
is as follows:
That which has been sanctioned by tradition and custom has an authority that is nameless,
and our finite historical being is marked by the fact that always the authority of what has
been transmitted – and not only what is clearly grounded – has power over our attitudes and
behaviour . . . . The validity of morals, for instance, is based on tradition. They are freely
taken over, but by no means created by a free insight or justified by themselves. That is
precisely what we call tradition: the ground of their validity . . . tradition has a justification
that is outside the arguments of reason and in large measure determines our institutions
and attitudes (Caputo, 1989, p. 258).
From this passage, a deep-seated deference towards tradition would seem
to characterise Gadamer’s basic philosophical orientation, despite his own
disavowal of the kind of “commitment” involved in such a stance and
despite his emphasis on the “scientific” (wissenschaftliche) character of
his enquiries. Deconstruction is deeply sceptical of such deference, as it
is of any conception of liberal education which views tradition primarily
as a repository of riches, or hallowed names, or authoritative canons. For
deconstruction, such deference, including all its institutionalised routines
and scholarly paraphernalia, fixes in place decisive hierarchies which
marginalise or exclude minority voices. Deference, in short, forecloses
precisely those questions which must be kept open in an unceasing and
active engagement. This brings us to the heart of Derrida’s concern.
DECONSTRUCTION: DERRIDA’S EARLIER PRESENTATIONS
Though he has made few specific references to Gadamer’s writings
(though plenty to Heidegger’s), the critical stance adopted by Derrida
towards hermeneutics is evident in a striking way in his earlier works.
Derrida is keen to undermine any quest for an original meaning which
might furnish humankind with a sense of origins, foundation, ground,
or what he calls arche. In particular, Derrida attacks what he calls the
“logocentric” character of Western philosophy for privileging this concern
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with origins and foundations. By “logocentric” Derrida means the assump-
tion – which he associates with the Greek word logos – that there is
fullness of truth and stability of meaning to be disclosed through philo-
sophical enquiry. According to Derrida, not only has this assumption
been embraced by the main traditions of Western philosophy, it has also
pervaded the more significant traditions of Western learning and civilisa-
tion. For Derrida however, such disclosure is already a closure of questions
which should remain radically open. It is a hunt for definitive accounts
and meanings which has the consequence of establishing invidious hier-
archies and canons. It marginalises whatever remains “other” or different;
whatever the hunt has failed to assimilate, or to subject to its assured grasp.
On Derrida’s account then, whatever has been established as authoritative
by philosophical arguments must be “deconstructed” to release the play
of alternative possibilities: to keep open the play of differing perspectives
which the philosophical search for “truth” seeks to restrict or to assimilate
in “logocentric” traditions of learning.
Derrida has held that “logocentric” assumptions inhabit the spoken
word in a more intractable way than they do the written word. Accord-
ingly, in his early work Of Grammatology (Derrida, 1976), he suggests
that the overcoming of metaphysics, which he claims Heidegger failed to
accomplish in the poetic turn taken by his later philosophy, might be more
successfully undertaken by a “deconstructive” reading of texts and canons.
For Derrida, such an enterprise takes the following form.
[I]t inaugurates the destruction, not the demolition but the deconstruction, of all significa-
tions that have their source in that of the logos. Particularly the signification of truth. All the
metaphysical determinations of truth, and even the one beyond metaphysical ontotheology
that Heidegger reminds us of, are more or less immediately inseparable from the instance
of the logos (Derrida, 1976, p. 10).
Central to this enterprise is what Derrida calls the play of “différance.”
In a 1968 address carrying the title Différance, Derrida announced that
this coinage of his described neither a concept nor a word, but rather a
two-fold strategic theme. Firstly, différance (in the sense of a deferral)
seeks to counter philosophy’s preoccupation with definitive meanings by
putting off until later, by deferring indefinitely, any definitive disclosures
of meaning or “presence” in the relation between human beings and Being.
Secondly, différance (in the sense of difference) seeks to keep in play an
unsecured plurality of possibilities, even an endless undecidability, with a
view to resisting all attempts at an authoritative pinning down, all efforts
to give certain meanings the status of a canon, or of “truth” (Derrida, 1984,
p. 7ff).
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The radicalness of Derrida’s “strategic theme,” and its iconoclastic
import for any conception of education as an enlightening encounter
with cultural traditions, emerges strongly in his 1967 book Writing and
Difference (1978 English). Here Derrida attacks what he perceives as
philosophy’s failures to overcome metaphysics, including the mistaken
paths he believes Heidegger’s later philosophy to have taken in its attempts
to reclaim a more original understanding of the relationship between
beings and Being. It is just this sense of deference towards eclipsed origins
that Derrida’s différance wants to break apart, as he detects in it a totalising
gesture which recalls metaphysical attempts to bring everything under the
sway of a unitary understanding. Derrida’s “theme” then is one “which is
no longer turned towards the origin;” his “strategy” is one which, in his
own words,
affirms play and tries to pass beyond man and humanism, the name of man being the name
of that being who, throughout the history of metaphysics or of ontotheology – in other
words through his entire history – has dreamed of full presence, the reassuring foundation,
the origin and the end of play (Derrida, 1978, p. 292).
In pursuing the theme of différance Derrida takes inspiration from what he
regards as a deliberate plurality of stances in Nietzsche’s writings – which
he insists hermeneutic philosophy (Heidegger and Gadamer) missed. He
champions a kind of play which highlights difference as the radicalisation
of “otherness.” He rebukes philosophy, including humanistic learning more
generally, for its saddened nostalgia for “the lost or impossible presence
of the absent origin.” In an idiom which betrays more than a little of the
Dionysian, he celebrates instead
the Nietzschean affirmation: that is, the joyous affirmation of the play of the world and of
the innocence of becoming, the affirmation of a world of signs without fault, without truth,
and without origin which is offered to an active interpretation (Derrida, 1978, p. 292).
AFTER CONFRONTATION – DECONSTRUCTION IN A
NEW KEY
These explorations of the earlier positions of Gadamer and Derrida flesh
out a little the contrasting stances to inherited traditions of learning
summarised by the terms I have used in the title: “deference” and “differ-
ence.” The contrast at this point is most striking as an opposition, or a
confrontation, between hermeneutics and deconstruction rather than as
a contrast of emphasis, or a contrast between approaches which might
yet be compatible in important respects. Where hermeneutics suggests an
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embrace of tradition, deconstruction reveals an attitude of suspicion, even
of subversion. Or so it would seem from our explorations so far. Yet, there
is something of cross-purposes, of opposition based in reciprocal misap-
prehension, between the positions of Gadamer and Derrida as outlined
in the previous two sections. Although the record of their interchange in
Paris in 1981 (Michelfelder and Palmer, 1989) shows that Gadamer made
renewed efforts to attend to the heart of Derrida’s arguments, it also reveals
the myriad of classical allusions and associations which throng Gadamer’s
own rather elaborate thinking. These form something of a bulwark when it
comes to allowing a voice of an altogether different kind, with altogether
different resonances than classical ones, to be heard. This may go some
way towards explaining Derrida’s curtness in the exchange. The record
also shows that Derrida was not at this time prepared to give ear to the
heart of Gadamer’s points (Michelfelder and Palmer, 1989, pp. 52–54,
58–71).
The intellectual warfare provoked by the apparent anarchy in Derrida’s
earlier formulations of deconstruction culminated in the “Cambridge
Affair” of 1992 (the controversy over the awarding of an honorary
doctorate to Derrida, recalled in Derrida, 1995, pp. 399–421). This warfare
remains active on more than a few campuses and its tone is in marked
contrast to the more ordered criticisms which have been made by thinkers
like Habermas of the alleged conservatism of Gadamer’s earlier present-
ations of hermeneutics. We have already noted briefly that Gadamer, in
response to these criticisms, has given a more critical character to his argu-
ments on practical philosophy. The reformulation of Derrida’s arguments
has been more dramatic. It can hardly be doubted that this reformulation
has been provoked, to some extent at least, by the intense divisiveness
occasioned by deconstruction and its influence in the campuses of the
Western world. In any case the reformulation involves a third element in
the notion of différence, in addition to the deferral of fixed meaning and
the affirmation of difference. This third element, present in a distant and
ambiguous way in Derrida’s earlier writings, is a unique kind of reverence;
a reverence which surpasses what is normally understood by deference.
It has been brought to the foreground in later writings like Specters of
Marx (Derrida, 1994), and “Faith and Knowledge” (Derrida, 1998), where
Derrida writes more explicitly of the ultimate point of deconstruction and
of its practical import.
Well, what remains irreducible to any deconstruction, what remains as undeconstructible
as the possibility itself of deconstruction is, perhaps, a certain experience of the emancip-
atory promise; it is perhaps the formality of a structural messianism, a messianism without
religion, even a messianic without messianism, an idea of justice – which we distinguish
from law and right and even from human rights – and an idea of democracy – which we
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distinguish from its current concept and from its determined predicates today (Derrida,
1994, p. 59).
This strong emphasis on the messianic has left behind the iconoclastic
playfulness that characterises the “Nietzschean affirmation” passage
quoted earlier. Caputo comments that this development in Derrida’s
thinking is bad news for his “Nietzscheanizing admirers” who thought they
had “found in deconstruction the consummating conclusion of the Death-
of-God” (Caputo, 1997, p. 158). But Derrida’s emphasis on the messianic
is not to be identified with any given religion – with its established institu-
tions or its doctrinal orthodoxies. It is oriented to the future, to that which
has yet to come. And on Derrida’s account, that which is yet to come is
not something which can be encapsulated in any determinate prophecy. It
is rather something which haunts and surprises the present. It is a “ghost
that we cannot and ought not do without” (Derrida, 1994, 168 ff).
From a critical point of view it might be said that the earlier charge
of anarchy against Derrida must now be dropped in favour of a charge of
abstract mysticism. Derrida would probably accept the “abstract” part of
this charge, as he declines to give definitive content to what he means by
the “other” and also continually calls attention to the abstract character
of his own later thought. He would probably reject the mysticism part
of the charge only if it implied any disengagement on the part of decon-
struction from practical concerns of justice. And here it is worth calling
readers’ attention to his two-part essay of 1989–1990, “Force of Law: The
‘Mystical Foundation of Authority’ ” (Derrida, 1992).
What Derrida calls “the messianic” identifies a committed, yet a some-
what indeterminate stance towards action, towards religion and towards
inherited traditions of thought. If one asks then, what it is for the
sake of which deconstruction is carried out, the answer lies not in any
aesthetic romp, whether Nietzschean or other in character. Its “emancip-
atory promise” lies rather in answering a call which is peculiarly religious
in character, without being the preserve of this or that religion. On this
understanding, deconstruction seeks to bear witness to, indeed to embody,
a certain faith; a faith which seeks to be worthy of the respect of all while at
the same time doing justice to the singularity of each person. In Derrida’a
own words:
This abstract messianicity belongs from the very beginning to the experience of faith,
of believing, of a credit that is irreducible to knowledge and of a trust that “founds”
all relation to the other in testimony. This justice, which I distinguish from right, alone
allows the hope, beyond all “messianisms,” of a universalizable culture of singularities, a
culture in which the abstract possibility of the impossible translation could nevertheless be
announced (Derrida, 1998, p. 18).
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Passages like these have something of a proclamation about them. That
they concern something which Derrida regards as crucially important can
hardly be denied. What is proclaimed is a direction, even a “pathway,” to
use Heidegger’s phrase. But though a general direction for thought and
action is indicated, the pathway remains indistinct in central respects, as
do the features the cultural landscape through which it passes.
HERMENEUTICS AND DECONSTRUCTION:
EXPERIENCING TRADITION ANEW
Acknowledging what Derrida himself calls the “responsibility” of the posi-
tions taken in his later arguments, a question must still be asked about
these positions: about what warrants them and what they seem to enjoin;
about Derrida’s preference for the abstract over the specific, for “an utterly
faceless other” over any concrete “other.” This question focuses on how
Derrida conceives of human beings’ relationships to inherited traditions
of learning and identifies an important area of common concern between
deconstruction and hermeneutics.
In addressing this question, the directions evident in Derrida’s later
arguments can be partly traced to his own deferential attitude to the thought
of the Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Levinas, especially to the differ-
ences drawn in Levinas’ thought between a biblical intelligibility and
a philosophical intelligibility. For Levinas, a philosophical intelligibility
conceives of God as an ontological presence: as Supreme Being, or Creator
of the world. A biblical intelligibility, by contrast, understands God in
interhuman and ethical terms: but as that in the interhuman which “points
towards the totally Other” (Levinas, 1984, pp. 56–57). The indefiniteness
of the “Other” in Levinas’ writing refers to the God of Talmudic tradition
and to “the sacredness of man’s relation to man through which God may
pass” (Levinas, 1984, p. 54). This illuminates much about the ultimate
sources of Derrida’s own thinking, in which the influences of Levinas
have continued to grow stronger. “Before a thought like that of Levinas,”
Derrida declared in 1986, “I never have any objection” (Caputo, 1997,
p. 127).
The “Nietzschean affirmation” in Derrida’s earlier writings tended to
cast himself and his legions of followers in the role of disciples who earn-
estly took up an injunction of Nietzsche’s in §409 of The Will to Power:
“What is needed above all is an absolute scepticism towards all inherited
concepts” (Nietzsche, 1967, p. 221). This early emphasis in Derrida’s
work placed it in a hostile relationship with hermeneutics, whose very
stock-in-trade is a sustained elucidation of the relation between human
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understanding and what addresses it through inherited traditions. Derrida’s
more recent works contain further declarations which depart from the
“Nietzschean affirmation” and which disclose a major return to classical
sources: “I feel that, however old I am, I am on the threshold of reading
Plato and Aristotle. I love them and feel I have to start again and again
and again” (Caputo, 1997, p. 9). And on St. Augustine, he adds “I have
enormous and immense admiration for him . . . So there is a love story and
a deconstruction between us” (Caputo, 1997, p. 21).
But this deferential turn to tradition in Derrida’s case is no more a form
of orthodoxy than Gadamer’s hermeneutics is a form of conservatism. In
my remaining remarks I want to take just two examples to highlight what
is distinctive and promising for practices of teaching and learning in the
common concerns of both, without attempting to assimilate deconstruction
to hermeneutics, or vice versa. The first example focuses on Plato and his
influence. The second concerns what Gadamer has called the “fusion of
horizons.”
Plato is characteristically taken by critics of metaphysics as a progenitor
of all that is “metaphysical” in Western traditions of learning, including by
Derrida in his earlier writings. It is clear that Derrida has not given up the
practice of “playing” with Plato’s works, or with those of any other major
thinker. The purpose of this play on Derrida’s part is now avowedly eman-
cipatory however. Derrida describes this purpose as seeking a “hetero-
geneity” within the corpus of Plato’s works which is at odds with, and
which seeks to unsettle, the received wisdom about that corpus. The play
is engaged in, in order to open up new spaces which allow Plato to
speak in a different voice, or voices: voices that render Plato’s works
newly challenging and thoughtworthy; voices that are inconsistent with
the “supposed system of Plato” which has become canonical in Western
traditions of teaching and learning.
Gadamer, for his part, has more than once reminded himself, and his
readers, that “Plato was no Platonist and that philosophy is not schol-
asticism” (Gadamer, 1985, p. 193; 1997, pp. 33–34). For Gadamer, all
enquiry is already a play, or rather, at play, in the to-and-fro of question
and answer between human efforts to understand and the active voices
of inheritances of learning which address these efforts. Though he would
hardly describe his efforts under a term such as “deconstruction,” Gadamer
points out that his philosophical approach embodies the Heideggerian task
of Destruktion – i.e., not a destroying, but “a dismantling of what has
been covered up” (Michelfelder and Palmer, 1989, p. 121). Indeed many of
Gadamer’s writings have been devoted to dismantling the Platonism which
became associated with Plato’s philosophy through Aristotle’s presenta-
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tion and critique of the theory of ideas; a critique which became decisive
for subsequent interpretations of Plato. In one of these studies, Gadamer is
more than usually outspoken in criticising the preconceptions which have
given Western learning its image of Plato.
With a persistence bordering on the absurd, the prevailing form of interpretation in which
Plato’s philosophy has been passed on to us has advocated the two-world theory, that is, the
complete separation of the paradigmatic world of ideas from the ebb and flow of change
in our experience of the sense-perceived world. Idea and reality are made to look like
two worlds separated by a chasm, and the interrelationship of the two remains obscure
(Gadamer, 1980, p. 156).
This example of Plato and his influence serves to show that any radical
rift between Derrida’s later deconstruction and Gadamer’s later hermen-
eutics is misconceived. In both cases a deferential attitude to what is
addressed by tradition to human understanding is in evidence, but so also
is an active critical questioning within that stance. Though carried out with
a very different style and in a very different idiom, this is a questioning
which discloses, in each case, incisive insights into encounters with inher-
itances of learning, but which also remains, in each case, an unfinished and
unfinishing search.
Turning now to the second example, Gadamer argues that a genuine
encounter with tradition involves what he calls a “fusion of horizons”
(Horizontverschmelzung): on the one hand the horizon of understanding
the learner brings with him or her to the encounter and, on the other, the
horizon of meaning that addresses the learner in this encounter. At first
sight this looks like a conservative notion. Unlike Derrida’s deconstructive
strategy, it seems to dissolve differences into the continuity and ances-
tral authority of received tradition. “Fusion” (Verschmelzung), however,
is not the most appropriate word to convey what is meant here. What
Gadamer has in mind is not a melting together in which all tensions are
laid to rest, but an attentive to-and-fro between the learner and the differ-
entness of that which addresses the learner. It is an interplay in which
tensions are uncovered and brought to the fore rather than glossed or
passed over (Gadamer, 1975, p. 273). In this interplay a particular embodi-
ment of a tradition – scientific, literary, religious etc. – is brought to active
articulation, but that articulation and its own presuppositions can also be
questioned and re-questioned by the learner. The learner can become in
this event a more fluent and more discerning participant. As an event of
learning moreover, this engagement alerts the learners to the twin dangers
of unquestioning discipleship on the one hand, and on the other, the kind
of critique which remains uncritical of its own embeddedness in historical
circumstance.
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In conclusion, perhaps enough has been said in exploring these two
examples to illustrate that the apparent dichotomy in the title “Difference
and Deference” might yet be more a contrast in emphasis than a clash
of directions – between hermeneutic conceptions of teaching and learning
and those which draw their inspiration from deconstruction. Yet, in order
to avoid any assimilation of deconstruction and hermeneutics, this contrast
of emphasis must itself be clarified. For Derrida, the notion of community,
and the related notion of dialogue, must be regarded with some reserva-
tion. On his understanding, community emphasises that “gathering” which
defines and gathers, and does so by including some and excluding others,
or what is “other.” So instead of community, he champions the more formal
“universalizable culture of singularities” as the most promising context for
engaging the issues which tradition, in its plurality, addresses to human
understanding. For Gadamer, “the conversation that we are” (das Gespräch
das wir sind), is an already existent feature of human life, if a frequently
disfigured one. From this starting point, hermeneutics understands tradi-
tion not as the burdening force of what has already been institutionalised
and now seeks compliance, but as the inescapable and abundant plurality
of what lies over us in our inheritances old and new. In human efforts to
become fluent in these inheritances, personal identity is disclosed as being
already differently influenced and coloured, as being already committed
in this way or that, but also, as called to an unfinishing search for truth.
This is a truth which escapes any efforts to render it uniform, or certain, or
absolute. It is a truth which is never possessed by human accomplishments,
but towards which the best efforts in teaching and learning are ever on the
way.
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